From the early activities of Snajperist in the context of tensions in Bosnia to the exercises in the Land Security Zone near the Kosovo border, these actions show a deliberate escalation near ethnically sensitive communities (Bieber, 2020; Judah, 2009).¹
The analysis of these actions shows two main dimensions:
1.Political dimension: Military exercises and the presence of armed forces near the border serve as a tool for symbolic messages and pressure on Albanian communities, creating an environment of fear and insecurity. This model has historical precedent in the region, where demonstrations of force consolidate political positions internally and send international signals (Bieber, 2020).
2.Military dimension: The choice of exercise areas, often near Albanian settlements while neutral alternatives exist (such as Vrtogosht), demonstrates a tactical strategy for psychological pressure and territorial control. This aligns with principles of proportionality and the necessity of justification under international law, but creates visible tensions in ethnic and regional relations (Dinstein, 2011; Schmitt, 2017).
In this context, the analysis of Vučić’s actions cannot be limited solely to technical military aspects but requires an integrated approach that includes international law, OSCE transparency mechanisms, and ECtHR jurisprudence on the rights of civilian communities. The result is a clear framework for understanding how politico-military acrobatics serve as instruments for changing the regional status quo and pressuring ethnic populations.
1.Security Implications of Military Exercises Near Populated Areas: The Case of Bujanovac
The conduct of military exercises by Serbia in the territory of the Municipality of Bujanovac, near the border with the Republic of Kosovo, represents a complex issue at the intersection of regional security, state sovereignty, and human rights protection. While states have the right to conduct military activities within their territory, this right is not absolute and is subject to limitations under international law and European standards (Dinstein, 2011:142; Schmitt, 2017:88).¹
2. Sovereignty and Its Limits
State sovereignty is a cornerstone of international law but cannot serve as a shield for violations of fundamental civil rights. ECtHR jurisprudence has emphasized the principle of a “fair balance” between public interest and individual rights (ECtHR, 1982: Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden). Dinstein (2011:142) and Schmitt (2017:88) argue that military actions near populated areas must be proportionally justified and transparent.
3. Transparency and Predictability
The OSCE Vienna Document (2011) prescribes measures for prior notification and information exchange regarding military activities:
•Prior notification for exercises above certain thresholds²,
•Data exchange on force composition and movements³,
•Inspections and verification mechanisms⁴.
Henderson (2013:57) and O’Connell (2016:88) emphasize that failure to inform about activities affecting civilians undermines trust and produces negative psychological effects.
4. Principle of Proportionality and Site Selection
The existence of alternative areas, such as Vrtogosht, which do not directly affect civilians, raises questions regarding the justification for conducting exercises between the Albanian settlements of Breznica and Muhovci.
According to ECtHR jurisprudence, any interference must be necessary and proportionate (ECtHR, 1982: Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden). Dinstein (2011:149) and Schmitt (2017:92) stress that proportionality is fundamental for military activities near populated areas, including the location and duration of exercises.
5. Property Rights
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR guarantees the protection of property. Interventions are permitted only if lawful, serve a public interest, and are proportionate⁵. Preventing access to property or restricting its use without compensation may constitute a violation of this standard (Weiler, 2010:67).
6. Private and Family Life
Article 8 of the ECHR protects private life and the home. In Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994), the ECtHR held that interventions affecting quality of life constitute violations of this provision⁶. Intensive military actions near civilian populations, especially in ethnically sensitive areas, may cause psychological stress and insecurity (Roberts & Guelff, 2000:112; Henderson, 2013:63).
7. Psychological Pressure and Degrading Treatment
Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. In Cyprus v. Turkey (2001), the Court recognized that continuous pressure and insecurity can constitute degrading treatment⁷. Structural actions by armed forces, combined with psychological pressure and access restrictions, may be interpreted as ongoing interventions with a degrading character (Roberts & Guelff, 2000:245).
8. Non-Discrimination
Article 14 of the ECHR prohibits discrimination. The ECtHR has emphasized that neutral measures can be discriminatory if they disproportionately affect a specific community (D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, 2007)⁸. In the Bujanovac context, selecting exercises near Albanian settlements, while neutral alternatives exist, may raise issues of indirect discrimination (Weiler, 2010:72).
9. Cumulative Effect and De Facto Displacement
ECtHR jurisprudence highlights that a series of individual measures can be assessed cumulatively. When combined—restriction of property access, presence of armed forces, and ongoing insecurity—these measures may result in the de facto displacement of the population (ECtHR, 2001: Cyprus v. Turkey; Dinstein, 2011:152).
10. Conclusion
Military exercises are permitted under international law, but their execution, choice of location, and impact on civilians determine their legality and legitimacy. In ethnically sensitive areas such as Bujanovac, strict adherence to principles of proportionality, transparency, and non-discrimination is crucial for maintaining stability and protecting fundamental human rights.
Footnotes
1.Bieber, F. (2020) Patterns of Authoritarian Politics in the Western Balkans. Berlin: Berghof Foundation.
2.Judah, T. (2009) The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
3.Dinstein, Y. (2011) The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.142.
4.Schmitt, M.N. (2017) Tallinn Manual 2.0. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.88.
5.OSCE (2011) Vienna Document 2011, Chapter V.
6.OSCE (2011) Vienna Document 2011, Chapter I.
7.OSCE (2011) Vienna Document 2011, Chapter IX.
8.Protocol No.1, Article 1, ECHR; Weiler, J.H.H. (2010) The Constitution of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.67.
9.ECtHR, Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994); Roberts, A. & Guelff, R. (2000) Documents on the Laws of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.112; Henderson, I. (2013) p.63.
10.ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey (2001); Roberts & Guelff, 2000:245.
11.ECtHR, D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (2007); Weiler, 2010:72.
The Land of Leka; 19.03.2026
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